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A Framework for Worst-Case and Stochastic Safety
Verification Using Barrier Certificates
Stephen Prajna, Member, IEEE, Ali Jadbabaie, Member, IEEE, and George J. Pappas, Senior Member, IEEE

Abstract—This paper presents a methodology for safety verification of continuous and hybrid systems in the worst-case and
stochastic settings. In the worst-case setting, a function of state
termed barrier certificate is used to certify that all trajectories of
the system starting from a given initial set do not enter an unsafe region. No explicit computation of reachable sets is required
in the construction of barrier certificates, which makes it possible
to handle nonlinearity, uncertainty, and constraints directly within
this framework. In the stochastic setting, our method computes
an upper bound on the probability that a trajectory of the system
reaches the unsafe set, a bound whose validity is proven by the existence of a barrier certificate. For polynomial systems, barrier certificates can be constructed using convex optimization, and hence
the method is computationally tractable. Some examples are provided to illustrate the use of the method.
Index Terms—Barrier certificates, hybrid systems, nonlinear
systems, safety verification, stochastic systems, sum of squares
optimization.

I. INTRODUCTION

C

OMPLEX behaviors that can be exhibited by modern engineering systems, many of which have hybrid (i.e., a mixture of continuous and discrete) dynamics, make the safety verification of such systems both crucial and challenging. The importance of safety verification increases tremendously for systems whose functions are safety critical, such as air traffic control [21], [50], life support devices [18], etc. In principle, safety
verification aims to show that starting at some initial conditions,
a system cannot evolve to some unsafe region in the state space.
The verification can be cast either in the worst-case setting or
the stochastic setting. A problem instance in the former setting
may consist of a system with an uncertain disturbance input,
where a hard bound on the input magnitude is known, and we
are asked to show that for all possible disturbance inputs the
system cannot evolve to the unsafe region. On the other hand,
in the latter setting no hard bound is given, but instead a stochastic characterization of the disturbance is available, and we
are asked to show that the probability of the system evolving to
the unsafe region is sufficiently small.
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For safety verification of continuous and hybrid systems in
the worst-case setting, various methods have been proposed.
Explicit computation of either exact or approximate reachable
sets corresponding to the continuous dynamics is crucial for
most of these methods. For linear continuous systems with
certain eigenvalue structures and semialgebraic initial sets,
exact reachable set calculation using quantifier elimination has
been proposed in [4] and [28]. Unfortunately, their approach requires knowing the exact solution of the differential equations,
and hence does not seem extendable to the nonlinear case.
In another vein, several techniques have also been developed
for approximate reachable set calculation. For linear systems,
there are results based on quantifier elimination [47], ellipsoidal calculus [26], [10], polygonal approximation [8], [6],
geometric programming [53], and real algebraic geometry [54].
Other techniques have been proposed for nonlinear systems,
for example, based on the Hamilton Jacobi equations [50],
polygonal approximations [14], and approximating the system
as a piecewise linear system [5]. In the case of hybrid systems,
most of the techniques are based on constructing abstractions
(i.e., discrete quotients) of the systems, and then performing
model checking on the resulting discrete systems. See, for
instance, [3], [6], [14], and [48].
In this paper, we will present a method for safety verification
that is different from the above approaches as it does not require
computation of reachable sets, but instead relies on a deductive
inference using what we term barrier certificates, which have
been previously used in the context of nonlinear model validation [36]. For a continuous system, a barrier certificate is a function of state satisfying a set of inequalities on both the function
itself and its Lie derivative along the flow of the system. In the
state space, the zero level set of a barrier certificate separates an
unsafe region from all system trajectories starting from a set of
possible initial states. Therefore, the existence of such a function provides an exact certificate/proof of system safety.
Similar to the Lyapunov approach for proving stability [25],
the main idea here is to study properties of the system without
the need to compute the flow explicitly. Although an overapproximation of the reachable set may also be used as a proof
for safety, a barrier certificate can be much easier to compute
when the system is nonlinear and uncertain. Moreover, a barrier certificate can be easily used to verify safety in infinite time
horizon. Note also that there are some connections between our
method and viability theory [7], invariant set theory [7], [9], and
also the verification approaches in [11], [22], [45], and [49]. We
will discuss these connections later as we progress.
Our method can be easily extended to handle hybrid systems.
In the hybrid case, a barrier certificate is constructed from a
set of functions of continuous state indexed by the system lo-
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cation.1 Instead of satisfying the aforementioned inequalities in
the whole continuous state space, each function needs to satisfy the inequalities only within the invariant of the location.
Functions corresponding to different locations are linked via appropriate conditions that must be satisfied during discrete transitions between the locations. The idea is analogous to using
multiple Lyapunov-like functions [23] for stability analysis of
hybrid systems.
With this methodology, it is possible to treat a large class of
hybrid systems, including those with nonlinear continuous dynamics, uncertainty, and constraints. When the vector fields of
the system are polynomials and the sets in the system description are semialgebraic (i.e., described by polynomial equalities
and inequalities), a tractable computational method called sum
of squares optimization [32], [33], [38], [39] can be utilized for
constructing a polynomial barrier certificate, e.g., using the software SOSTOOLS [38], [39]. While the computational cost of
this construction depends on the degrees of the vector fields and
the barrier certificate in addition to the number of discrete locations and the continuous state dimension, for fixed polynomial
degrees the complexity grows polynomially with respect to the
other quantities. Hence, we expect our method to be more scalable than many other existing methods. Successful application
of our method to a NASA life support system, which is a nonlinear hybrid system with 6 discrete modes and 10 continuous
states, has been reported in [18].
In addition to the worst-case setting outlined above, we will
also consider safety verification of continuous and hybrid systems in the stochastic setting. The stochasticity of a continuous system may originate from random inputs to the dynamics,
which can be taken into account by considering stochastic differential equations. In the case of stochastic hybrid systems,
stochasticity may also be induced by randomness in the discrete
transitions. Study of systems modelled by stochastic differential equations has a long history and readers can find relevant
references in [31]. On the other hand, only quite recently have
people started to consider stochastic hybrid systems. See [15],
[17], [19], [20], and [34] for an overview.
When the system is stochastic, answering the safety verification question in a worst-case nonstochastic manner will usually
lead to a very conservative and restrictive answer, since there is
no hard bound on the value of stochastic input. Indeed it is more
natural to formulate and consider a safety verification problem
that has a probabilistic interpretation. For example, it may be
of interest to prove that the probability that a system trajectory
reaches the unsafe region is lower than a certain safety margin.
For some references on safety verification of stochastic continuous and hybrid systems, readers are referred to [13], [21], [52],
and [12].
The approach that we take to solve the stochastic safety verification problem still relies on barrier certificates. However, instead of using a barrier certificate whose zero level set separates
the unsafe region from all possible system trajectories, we will
use a barrier certificate that yields a supermartingale (loosely
speaking, its expected value along time is nonincreasing) under
the given system dynamics. In addition, we ask that the value of
the barrier certificate at the initial state be lower than its value
1The

term “location” here means discrete state; cf. Section II-B–1.

at the unsafe region. The probability of reaching the unsafe region can then be bounded from above using a Chebyshev-like
inequality for supermartingales. We derive conditions that must
be satisfied by barrier certificates for stochastic continuous systems and a class of stochastic hybrid systems called switching
diffusion processes. Similar to their nonstochastic counterpart,
polynomial barrier certificates can be computed using sum of
squares optimization when the description of the system is polynomial and the sets are semialgebraic.
For these classes of systems, our method can be used to efficiently compute an exactly guaranteed upper bound on the probability that a system trajectory reaches the unsafe set. References [13] and [12], for example, suggest (theoretical) ways to
calculate such a probability, yet they have not provided a computational technique for that. Reference [21] does provide a computational method to approximate the reach probability for stochastic differential equations, but since their method is based
on discretizing the state space, there are still some unresolved
issues with guaranteeing the accuracy of the computed probability and the scalability of the method. Finally, the work in [52]
approximates the reach probability for stochastic discrete time
systems using randomized simulations, and currently there is no
accuracy guarantee either.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we consider safety verification in the worst-case setting. Safety verification in the stochastic setting is addressed in Section III. Computation of barrier certificates using sum of squares optimization is discussed in Section IV. Some examples will be given in
Section V, and finally the paper will be ended by conclusions in
Section VI.
1) Notations: Most of the notations are standard. We denote
the set of real numbers by and the Euclidean -space by .
matrix , i.e., the sum of its diagonal elThe trace of an
. By
we mean a funcements, is denoted by
to
. We denote the spaces of
tion mapping
-times continuously differentiable functions mapping
to
by
, and when
we will write
.
are
Correspondingly, the spaces of continuous functions on
denoted by
and
. For a differentiable function
, we use
to denote the row vector
. The Hesof partial derivatives of with respect to
sian of a twice-differentiable function
is de. Finally,
and
denote
noted by
the total and conditional probability, respectively, whereas
and
denote the total and conditional expectation.
II. SAFETY VERIFICATION IN THE WORST-CASE SETTING
A. Continuous Systems
1) Convex Conditions: Consider a continuous system described by a set of ordinary differential equations:
(1)
with the state
taking its value in
and the disturbance
taking its value in
. Here
is assumed to
input
be piecewise continuous and bounded on any finite time interval.
Some smoothness conditions will be imposed on the vector field
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. At the least it will be continuous, which makes
piecewise continuously differentiable.
In safety verification, only parts of trajectories that are conand that start from a given set of
tained in a given set
are considered. We denote the
possible initial states
, with
. With these
unsafe region of the system by
notations, the safety property in the worst-case setting can be
defined as follows. The definition can be directly extended for
other classes of systems as needed.
, the
Definition 1 (Safety): Given (1), the state set
, the unsafe set
, and the disturbance
initial set
, we say that the safety property holds if there
set
and a piecewise continuous and
exist no time instant
that gives rise to an unsafe
bounded disturbance
satisfying
system trajectory, i.e., a trajectory
,
, and
for all
.
Our method for verifying safety relies on the existence of
what we will call a barrier certificate. For continuous systems,
the following proposition states the conditions that are satisfied
by a barrier certificate.
and
,
,
Proposition 2: Let
,
be given, with
. Suppose
such that
there exists a differentiable function
(2)
(3)
(4)
then the safety of the system in the sense of Definition 1 is guaranteed.
Proof: Our proof is by contradiction. Assume that there
satisfying (2)–(4), while at the
exists a barrier certificate
same time the system is not safe, i.e., there exist a time instance
, a disturbance signal
, and an initial
condition
such that a trajectory
of the system
satisfies
for all
and
starting at
. Condition (4) implies that the derivative of
with respect to time is nonpositive on the time interval
.
A direct consequence of this (which for example can be shown
must be less than
using the mean value theorem) is that
, which is contradictory to (2)–(3). Thus, the
or equal to
initial hypothesis is not correct: the system must be safe.
A function
satisfying the conditions in Proposition 2 is
provides a
termed a barrier certificate. The zero level set of
“barrier” between possible system trajectories and the given unsafe region, in the sense that no trajectory of the system starting
from the initial set can cross this level set to reach the unsafe region. In proving that the system is safe, no explicit computation
of system trajectories nor reachable sets is required.
In the above proposition we have assumed that the disturbance input can vary arbitrarily fast. If the variation of the disturbance is bounded, then a less conservative verification can be
that also
performed by considering a barrier certificate
depends on the instantaneous value of the disturbance and modifying (2)–(4) accordingly. For example, in (4) we need to take
, with
into account the extra derivative term
the disturbance variation taking its value in some bounded set.
Note that the set of barrier certificates satisfying the conditions in Proposition 2 is convex. This can be established by

and
satisfying the above conditaking arbitrary
tions and showing that for all
satisfies the conditions as well. The convexity
. As we
property is very beneficial for the computation of
in this
will see later in Section IV-A, a barrier certificate
convex set can be searched directly using convex optimization.
is actually an invariant
Since the set
set within , the method presented above is closely related to
the smallest invariant set approach for safety verification (see,
e.g., [22]). The latter approach differs from ours in that it tries
to compute the smallest invariant set that contains , and then
show that this set does not intersect . Although such a set will
give the least conservative verification result, it can have a very
complicated description, and in general is not computable. Thus,
for computation purposes, it is necessary to consider invariant
sets whose descriptions have bounded complexity (e.g., sets described using finite degree polynomials). Nevertheless, among
invariant sets whose descriptions have bounded complexity, the
smallest set may not be one that does not intersect . Not only
that, such smallest invariant set may still be very difficult to find
and may not be unique. Our approach, on the other hand, uses
that does not intersect
an arbitrary invariant set containing
. As such, our method is computationally much easier than
the smallest invariant set approach.
We would like to remark that other approaches similar to ours
are also presented in [45], [49]. These papers address the verification problem from a computer science point of view, and
propose methods for constructing invariants of the system. An
invariant here is a property that holds for every reachable state
of the system. Thus, in the barrier certificate framework, for exis an invariant of the system. The difference is
ample,
that their conditions for the invariants are more restrictive than
ours, and the invariants are not computed using convex optimization, but instead using the Gröbner basis method followed
by solving a system of linear equations.
2) Nonconvex Conditions: Although the conditions in Proposition 2 are good for computation since they define a convex set
of barrier certificates, the conditions seem rather conservative
(i.e., within a class of barrier certificates with bounded complexity) as the derivative inequality (4) needs to be satisfied on
the whole state set . It is natural to expect that the conditions
can be relaxed by requiring a similar derivative inequality to
for which
.
hold only on and near the set of
This kind of condition is used in Proposition 3 below. Unfortunately, the set of barrier certificates will no longer be convex,
hence a direct computation of a barrier certificate using convex
optimization is not possible, although we can still try to search
for a barrier certificate in the nonconvex set using an iterative
method, as we will see in Section IV-B.
and the sets
Proposition 3: Let the system
be given, with
. If there exists a function
that
satisfies the following conditions:
(5)
(6)
(7)
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then the safety of the system in the sense of Definition 1 is guaranteed.
Proof: Suppose that a disturbance signal
and a corresponding unsafe trajectory
exist.
Let and be two time instants such that
, and

Now integrate
over the time into obtain a contradiction, thus proving that the
terval
system is safe.
The above proposition is sufficient for our purposes and also
the proof is straightforward. However, it is interesting to note
that other (nonconvex) conditions can be derived using viability
theory [7]. Interested readers are referred to [35]. An early work
on safety verification using nonconvex conditions that can be
considered as alternatives to Proposition 3 can also be found
in [11]. However, no computational scheme is provided in that
paper, and the construction of safety proofs has to be done manually.
B. Hybrid Systems
1) Modelling Framework: Throughout this subsection, we
adopt the hybrid modelling framework that was first proposed
in [1]; see also [2] for a more detailed explanation and example.
with the
A hybrid system is a tuple
following components.
is the continuous state space.
•
is a finite set of locations. The overall state space of the
•
, and a state of the system is denoted
system is
.
by
•
is the set of initial states.
is the invariant, which assigns to each location
•
a set
that contains all possible continuous states
while at location .
is a set of vector fields. assigns to each
•
a set
which constrains the evolution of the continuous state according to the differential
.
inclusion
is a relation capturing discrete transitions be•
tween two locations. Here a transition
indicates that from the state
the system can undergo
.
a discrete jump to the state
Valid trajectories of the hybrid system
start at some iniand are concatenations of a sequence
tial state
of continuous flows and discrete transitions. During a continuous flow, the discrete location is maintained and the continuous state evolves according to the differential inclusion
, with
remains inside the invariant set
.
For our purpose, we will model the uncertainty in the continuous
flow by introducing some disturbance inputs in the following
manner:
for some
where
is a vector field that governs the flow of the
system at location , and
is a vector of disturbance in-

. We assume that
puts that takes value in the set
is piecewise continuous and bounded on any finite time
for all
. Finally,
interval, and that
, a discrete transition to
can occur if
at a state
. We assume nondeterminism in the discrete transition, i.e., the transition may or may not occur, but no
stochastic characterization is used or given.
,
Given a hybrid system and a set of unsafe states
the safety verification problem is concerned with proving that all
valid trajectories of the hybrid system cannot enter the unsafe
. More specifically, the safety property is defined as
region
follows.
Definition 4 (Safety—Hybrid Systems): Given a hybrid
, the safety property holds
system and an unsafe set
, a piecewise continuous
if there exist no time instant
, and a finite
and bounded disturbance input
sequence of transition times
that give rise to an unsafe system trajectory, i.e., a trajectory
satisfying
for
, and
. (Note
that the disturbance input here must also satisfy
for all
).
In our analysis conditions, we will also need the following
, the sets of initial and unsafe
definitions. For each location
continuous states are defined as
and
, both of which
can be empty. To each tuple
with
, we associate
for
a guard set
some
, which is the set of continuous states from which
the system can undergo a transition from location to location
, and a (possibly set valued) reset map
, whose domain is
.
Obviously, if no discrete transition from location to location
is possible, then
will be regarded as empty, and the
associated reset map needs not be defined.
2) Conditions for Safety: Verification of hybrid systems
should use a barrier certificate that not only is a function of
the continuous state, but also depends on the discrete location.
For this purpose, we construct a barrier certificate from a set of
functions of continuous state, where each function corresponds
to a discrete location of the system. Since in each location the
continuous state can only take value within the invariant of
the location, each function only needs to satisfy inequalities
similar to (2)–(4) or (5)–(7) in the invariant associated to its
location. Functions corresponding to different locations are
linked via appropriate conditions that take care of possible
discrete transitions between the locations. Analogous idea
was used in stability analysis of affine hybrid systems using
piecewise quadratic Lyapunov functions [23].
We state the conditions that must be satisfied by the barrier
certificate in the following theorem. The notations and assumptions imposed on the system are as described in Section II-B–1.
Theorem 5: Let the hybrid system and the unsafe set
be given. Suppose there exists a collection
of functions
which, for all
and
, satisfy
(8)
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(9)

such that
for all

(10)
s.t.
(11)

Then the safety of the system in the sense of Definition 1 is
guaranteed.
Proof: Assume that a barrier certificate
satisfying the above conditions can be found. Take any trajec,
tory of the hybrid system that starts at arbitrary
and consider the evolution of
along this trajectory.
. Next, (10) implies
Condition (8) asserts that
cannot
that during a segment of continuous flow
become positive, which can be shown using Proposition 3. On
the other hand, (11) guarantees that during a discrete transition
cannot jump to a positive value. Consequently, any
,
such trajectory can never reach an unsafe state
whose
is positive according to (8). We conclude that
the safety of the system is guaranteed.
Similar to what we encounter in the continuous case,
(10)–(11) in the above theorem define a nonconvex set of
barrier certificates. Conditions defining a convex set of barrier
certificates are given in the following theorem.
,
Theorem 6: Let the hybrid system , the unsafe set
and a collection of nonnegative constants
be given. Suppose there exists a collection
of differentiable functions
which, for all
and
, satisfy
(12)
(13)

is useful for handling integral
other hand, choosing
constraints, as we will shortly see.
3) Hybrid Systems With Constraints: In the remainder of this
subsection, we will briefly discuss how constraints can be incorporated in verification of hybrid systems. There are three kinds
of constraints that can be handled: algebraic equality, algebraic
inequality, and integral constraints. Here we will focus on integral constraints, as verification by explicit calculation of reachable sets is the most difficult when such constraints exist. To the
best of our knowledge, the only existing literature addressing
this problem is [24], in which a method for bounding an image
of the flow map between two affine switching surfaces for affine
hybrid systems with integral quadratic constraints is presented.
is contained in
Instead of assuming that the disturbance
, suppose now that
and the continuous state
is
constrained via a “hard” integral constraint2

(16)
where
is again assumed to be piecewise continuous and
bounded on any finite time interval. Constraints like this usually arise in systems analysis in the form of integral quadratic
constraints [29] and are useful, e.g., for describing a set of
norm-bounded operators (cf. the example in Section V-B),
which may represent unmodelled continuous dynamics. Apart
from this change, valid trajectories of the system are generated
in the same manner as in Section II-B–1. Conditions guaranteeing safety when an integral constraint is present are given in
the following theorem.
,
Theorem 9: Let the hybrid system , the unsafe set
. Suppose there exist
and (16) be given, with
a collection
of functions
and
that satisfy
constant multipliers

(14)
for all

(17)
(18)

(15)

Then the safety of the system in the sense of Definition 4 is
guaranteed.
Proof: Analogous to the Proof of Theorem 5, but with
Proposition 2 now being used to show that during a segment
of continuous flow
cannot become positive.
Remark 7: The convexity of the set of barrier certificates in
Theorem 6 can be established by taking two arbitrary collections
and
satisfying the conditions
the collection
in the theorem and showing that for all
satisfies the conditions as
well. Note that for this convexity it is crucial that the multipliers
are fixed in advance.
Remark 8: Two possible choices for
are 0 and 1.
corresponds to modifying (11) to
The choice
for all
for some
and
, and in this case a successful verification will
actually prove that the system is safe even if during a transition
from location to the continuous state is allowed to jump to
in the image of the reset map. On the
any continuous state

(19)
for all
(20)
(21)
for all
and
,
. Then the safety of the
system is guaranteed in the sense of Definition 4 [except that
is not contained in
, but instead must satisfy (16)].
Proof: Assume that a barrier certificate satisfying the
above conditions can be found, but at the same time there exists
a
and a valid trajectory of the hybrid system on the time
such that
. Assume that discrete
interval
transitions for this trajectory occur at time
where
2The

notion “hard” here means that the constraint must be satisfied for all
(x( ); d( ))d
0.
Some important integral constraints for robustness analysis of uncertain systems
[29] are soft constraints.

t

 0; a “soft” integral constraint has the form
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the system switches to location
. Denote the
continuous states before and after the -th transition by
and
, respectively. Then from (19) and (20) we obtain

is not guaranteed to always
Since in general the process
lie inside the set , we define the stopped process corresponding
and as follows.
to
Definition 12 (Stopped Process): Suppose that is the first
from the open set
. The stopped
time of exit of
is defined by
process
for
for

Now, (20) guarantees that
for
, and, hence, it follows from the above inequality that
. Using (17)–(18), we obtain a contradiction, thus, proving the theorem.
Remark 10: The set of
and satisfying the
conditions in Theorem 9 is convex.
III. SAFETY VERIFICATION IN THE STOCHASTIC SETTING
A. Continuous Systems
and a stanConsider a complete probability space
-valued Wiener process
defined on this space. In
dard
this subsection, we will be dealing with stochastic differential
equations of the form
(22)
, and
are of appropriate dimenwhere
sions. We denote the state space, the initial set, and the unsafe
, and
, all of which are subsets of
set, respectively, by
, with assumed to be bounded and
. To
guarantee the existence and uniqueness of solution, we will also
and
satisfy the local Lipschitz contiassume that both
nuity and the linear growth condition on . Since is bounded,
the last condition can be replaced by the boundedness of
and
on .
described above is right
It can be shown that the process
continuous and a strong Markov process [31]. The generator
of the process
is defined as follows.
Definition 11 (Generator): The (infinitesimal) generator
of the process
is defined by

and the domain of the generator is the set of all functions
such that the above limit exists for all .
The generator can be considered as the stochastic analog of
the Lie derivative, and characterizes the evolution of the expecvia the so-called Dynkin’s formula (see, e.g.,
tation of
[44]):

for
generator.

and for any function

in the domain of the

The stopped process
satisfies various properties. For
example, it inherits the right continuity and strong Markovian
. Furthermore, in most cases the generator
property of
is identical to the one corresponding to
corresponding to
on the set
, and is equal to zero outside of the set
[27]. This will be implicitly assumed throughout the chapter.
, we
Having defined the system and the stopped process
can now formulate the safety verification problem for stochastic
differential equations as follows.
Problem 13: Given the system (22) and the bounded sets
, compute an upper bound for
to reach . In other words,
the probability of the process
such that
find
for some
for all

(23)

or
for some

(24)

whose support is in
is
if an initial probability distribution
.
also given for
Obviously, the ultimate objective of safety verification is to
show that the above probability is small enough, for example
less than some safety margin. Hence, it is of interest to obtain
an upper bound that is as tight as possible.
In this section, our approach to solve the above problem is
from
based on finding an appropriate barrier certificate
which we can deduce an upper bound . As in the nonstochastic
case, the approach is again analogous to using Lyapunov functions for proving stability.3 However, instead of requiring the
to decrease along the trajectory of the system,
value of
decreases or stays
we ask that the expected value of
constant as time increases. A process satisfying such a property is called a supermartingale [44]. In our setting, a process
is a supermartingale with respect to the filtration
generated by the process
, if
is
-meafor all
, and
surable for all

for all
. Since we will use
that is twice continuously
takes its value in a bounded set , the
differentiable and
first and second conditions are always fulfilled. For nonnegative
3See, e.g., [27] for some notions of stochastic stability and stochastic Lyapunov functions.

PRAJNA et al.: WORST-CASE AND STOCHASTIC SAFETY VERIFICATION

1421

supermartingales, there exists the following result, which will be
used several times here.
Lemma 14 ([27]; see [16] for the Discrete Version): Let
be a supermartingale with respect to the process
and
be nonnegative on . Then for a positive and any
initial condition

Thus the probability bound (23) is proven.
is given, then
Finally, if an initial probability distribution
the above derivation can be combined with the law of total probability and (30) to obtain

for some
(25)
At this point, we are ready to state and prove our first main
result in the stochastic setting.
Theorem 15: Let the stochastic differential (22) and the
be given, with
bounded sets
being locally Lipschitz continuous and bounded on
. Consider the stopped process
. Suppose there exists a
such that
function
(26)
(27)

hence, finishing the proof.
Note that it is possible to choose to be at most equal to one,
the function
will satisfy (26)–(29)
since when
and (30). The intuitive idea behind the theorem is clear. The
is a supermartingale, and therefore its value is
process
likely to stay constant or decrease as time increases. When we
(i.e., as gets smaller)
start from a lower initial value of
it becomes less likely for the trajectory to reach the unsafe set,
is greater than or equal to one. This
on which the value of
is quantified by Lemma 14, which provides a Chebyshev-like
inequality for bounding the probability of the distribution tail.

(28)
B. Hybrid Systems
(29)
then the probability bound (23) holds. If an initial probability
distribution
is given, then (27)–(29) and
(30)
imply that the probability bound (24) holds.
Proof: For the stochastic differential (22), the generator of
the process is given by (see, e.g., [31])

where the domain of the generator is the set of twice continuously differentiable functions with compact support. Since is
. Next, using Dynkin’s
bounded, we can use any
formula, we have for

and therefore (29) will imply that
is a supermartingale.
By (28) and Lemma 14 we conclude that (25) holds. Now use
, which
(26) and the fact that
follows from (27), to obtain the following series of inequalities:
for some

In this subsection, we consider a class of stochastic hybrid
systems called switching diffusion processes [17]. Systems in
this class have both continuous and discrete states, where the
continuous state evolves according to a stochastic differential
equation that depends on the discrete state, and the discrete trajectory itself is a Markov chain whose transition matrix depends
on the continuous state. As implied by the name, these systems
are switching systems, meaning that the value of the continuous
state does not change during a discrete transition. The method
proposed in Section III-A can be extended to handle switching
diffusion processes. The main idea is similar to before, i.e., use
the appropriate generator for the process, find a barrier certificate from the domain of the generator that yields a supermartingale, and then bound the reach probability using the barrier certificate.
Formally, a switching diffusion process is a tuple
with the following components:
is the continuous state space, assumed to be
•
bounded.
is a finite set of locations. The overall state space of
•
, and the state is denoted by
the system is
.
is an initial probability measure, with its support in
•
.
, is a set of drift vector fields.
•
, is a set of diffusion coefficients,
•
where the -th column of corresponds to the th compo-valued Wiener process
.
nent of the
, is a set of -dependent tran•
for all if
, and
sition rates, with
for all
.
, with
.
Here we denote the unsafe set by
A trajectory of the system starts with an initial condition
drawn from the initial probability measure . As mentioned
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above, the continuous part of the state evolves according to a
stochastic differential equation, which at location is given by

On the other hand, the dynamics of the discrete state is described
by the following transition probability:

nonnegative (as implied by (32)), Lemma 14 can be applied.
The rest of the proof is similar to the Proof of Theorem 15.
In principle, other classes of stochastic hybrid systems such as
piecewise deterministic Markov processes [15], stochastic hybrid systems of Hu et al. [20], and stochastic hybrid systems of
Hespanha [19] can be handled in a similar fashion, by using the
suitable generator for each class and modifying the other conappropriately.
ditions for
IV. COMPUTATIONAL METHOD

if
if
with
. See [17] for more details on how the discrete transitions are generated. During a discrete transition, the value of the
continuous state is held constant. It is assumed that the discrete
. In additransition is independent from the Wiener process
, and
are bounded and
tion, we assume that
locally Lipschitz continuous. Under these assumptions, the solution to the stochastic differential equation at each location exis a Markov process
ists and is unique, and also that
and almost every sample path of it is a right continuous function
[17]. Similar to the continuous case, we stop the process when
goes out from
.
The conditions for a barrier certificate are stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 16: Let the switching diffusion process
be given, with bounded
and
s,
s, and
bounded, locally Lipschitz continuous
s. Suppose there exists a collection
of
, which satisfy
functions
(31)
(32)

(33)
for all

Minimize
subject to
is SOS for
where the s are scalar real decision variables, the
s are
are given polynomials
given real numbers, and the
(with fixed coefficients). See also another equivalent canonical
form of SOS programs in [38]. Here we say that the polynois an SOS if it can
mial
for some polynobe decomposed as
. Sum of squares programs can be
mials
solved via semidefinite programming, e.g., using the software
SOSTOOLS [38], [39] in conjunction with a semidefinite
programming solver such as SeDuMi [46].
A. Direct Computation of Barrier Certificates

, and
(34)

Then
for some
Proof: Define

For systems whose vector fields are polynomial and whose
set descriptions are semialgebraic (i.e., described by polynomial
equalities and inequalities), a tractable computational method
for constructing a barrier certificate exists if we also postulate
the barrier certificate to be polynomial. The method uses sum of
squares optimization [32], [33], [38], [39]—a convex relaxation
framework based on sum of squares decompositions of multivariate polynomials [43] and semidefinite programming [51].
A sum of squares (SOS) program is a convex optimization
problem of the following form:

.
. In this case

The setting of Section II-B–2 is used in this and the next subsections; other settings can be treated analogously. Consider a
hybrid system whose vector fields
are polynomial for
. Furthermore, assume that for all
the invariant
all
is given by
region

In these set descriptions, the
s are vectors of polynomials,
and the inequalities are satisfied entry-wise. For example, when
is the -dimensional hypercube
,
we may define
is the generator of the process, and
is in the domain of
for all
. See [17]. Condition
the generator if
is a supermartingale, which can
(33) implies that
is also
be shown using Dynkin’s formula. Since

..
.
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, and
. Finally, assume

to be the value of the reset map
evaluated at
.
To compute a polynomial barrier certificate for this system,
are used to parameterize sets of
real coefficients
, for all
, in the following
candidates for the functions
way:
(35)
s are elements of some finite polynomial basis;
where the
for example, they could be monomials of degree less than or
equal to some pre-chosen bound. Then the search for a barrier
, or equivalently the values of
s,
certificate
such that the convex conditions in Theorem 6 are satisfied can
be directly performed by solving a SOS program, as stated in
the following algorithm.
Algorithm 17 (Direct Method): Let the hybrid system and
,
the descriptions of
be given, along with some nonnegative conand
, for each
and
.
stants
s: Fix a degree bound for the barrier
• Parameterize
for all
in terms
certificate, and parameterize
s as in (35), by having all
of some unknown coefficients
monomials whose degrees are less than the degree bound
s.
as the
• Parameterize the multipliers: In a similar way, fix
some degree bounds and use some other unknown coefficients to parameterize polynomial vectors
of the same dimensions as the corres.
sponding
• Compute the coefficients: Choose a small positive
number . Use SOS optimization to find values of the
coefficients which make the expressions
(36)
(37)

(38)

Proposition 18: If the sum of squares optimization problem
given in Algorithm 17 is feasible, then the polynomials
obtained by substituting the corresponding values of s
to their polynomial parameterization satisfy the conditions of
is a barrier certificate.
Theorem 6, and therefore
and (36)
Proof: We show that the entries of
being SOS implies (8) as follows. Notice that
is globally nonnegative since it is a SOS
the second term is nonand also that for any
for all
negative. Thus
, i.e., (8) holds. Similar arguments can be used for
the other conditions.
Remark 19: If the reset map
actually maps
to a singleton, e.g., if
for some polynomial vector
, then
expression (39) can be simplified to
.
The computational cost of Algorithm 17 depends on three
factors: the degrees of (36)–(39), the cardinality of , and the
. For fixed degrees, however, the required
dimension of
computations grow polynomially with respect to the cardinality
. A hierarchy of computaof and/or the dimension of
tions can then be proposed, where we start with a low degree for
the barrier certificate and increase it as needed. In many cases, a
low degree barrier certificate can be used to verify safety if the
system is “sufficiently” safe (in the sense that a small perturbation will not make the system unsafe).
B. Iterative Computation
The SOS optimization approach described in the previous
subsection can be used to find a barrier certificate that lies in
the convex set defined by the conditions in Theorem 6. The conditions in Theorem 5, however, define a nonconvex set of barrier
certificate. As a consequence, the search for a barrier certificate
in this set cannot be performed through direct SOS optimization, although conditions for the barrier certificate can still be
formulated as sum of squares conditions as follows.
and the deProposition 20: Let the hybrid system
, and
scriptions of
be given. Suppose there exist polynomials
and
; positive numbers and ; and vectors of sums
of squares
, and
; such that
the following expressions:

(40)
(41)

(39)

(42)

and the entries of
sums of
squares, for each

and

.

(43)
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are sums of squares for all
and
.
satisfies the conditions in
Then the collection
Theorem 5, and therefore the safety property holds.
Proof: Analogous to the Proof of Proposition 18.
via
In this case, direct computation of
SOS optimization is impossible due to the multiplication of
s with those of
s
the unknown coefficients of
s in (42)–(43). By fixing either of them, all the
and
unknown coefficients will be constrained in an affine manner,
which reduces the problem4 to a SOS program. For example,
s
fixing the multipliers will convexify the set of
satisfying (40)–(43), resulting in a smaller convex set contained
in the original nonconvex set.
The motivation to search for barrier certificates in the original nonconvex set is that when we put a bound on their complexity (e.g., by bounding the polynomial degrees), such barrier certificates are generally less conservative than barrier certificates in the convex set (cf. the comment at the beginning of
Section II-A–2). For instance, the former may prove safety for
larger disturbance sets, guard sets, unsafe sets, etc. We will now
present a simple iterative method to search for a barrier certificate in the nonconvex set. In the iteration we start with some
sufficiently small sets, and increase their sizes as the iteration
progresses.
Algorithm 21 (Iterative Method):
1) Initialization: Start with sufficiently small
, etc. Specify
and
in adand
vance, e.g., by choosing
or . Search for
s and the remaining multipliers
using SOS optimization as described in Algorithm 17.
s obtained from
2) Fix the barrier certificate: Fix the
, etc. Search
the previous step. Enlarge
s,
s, and the remaining multipliers.
for
s and
s
3) Fix the multipliers: Fix the
obtained from the previous step. Enlarge
, etc. Search for
s and the remaining
multipliers. Repeat to Step 2.
It should be noted, however, that solving a nonconvex optimization problem by an iteration like this is not guaranteed to
yield the globally optimal solution, as the iteration may actually
converge to a local optimum. In our case, the barrier certificate
we obtain at the end of our iteration may not be a barrier certificate that is able to prove safety for the maximum possible
disturbance sets, etc.
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program, whose value is to be minimized. The minimum value
of obtained from the optimization will be the tightest upper
bound for a given polynomial and sum of squares parameterization. Obviously, we may get a better bound as we expand the
parameterization, for example, when we use higher degree barrier certificates. However, there is a tradeoff between using a
larger set of candidate barrier certificates and the computational
complexity of finding a true certificate within it.
Similar to the stochastic differential equation case, a polynofor a switching diffusion
mial barrier certificate
processes can be computed using sum of squares optimization,
, and
are polynomials and the sets
provided
are semialgebraic.
V. EXAMPLES
Here we will present two examples in the worst-case setting
and one example in the stochastic setting. The MATLAB m-files
for solving these examples can be found at http://www.cds.caltech.edu/~prajna/files/PraJP06. More examples can be found in
[41]. For an application to a NASA life support system, which
is a hybrid system with 6 discrete locations and 10 continuous
state variables, see [18].
A. Continuous System
Consider the two-dimensional system (taken from [25, p.
180])

with
. We want to verify that all trajectories of the
system starting from the initial set
will never reach the unsafe set
. Note that the system has
.
a stable focus at the origin and two saddle points at
contains a part of the unstable manifold corresponding
Since
, the safety of this system cannot be
to the equilibrium
verified exactly by computation of forward reachable sets in a
finite time horizon.
that satisfies (2)–(4) is
A polynomial barrier certificate
given by, e.g.,
. For example, we can show
is less than or equal
that the Lie derivative
to zero by exhibiting the quadratic form
, with

C. Computation of Barrier Certificates for Stochastic Systems
When the description of the stochastic differential equation
in Section III-A is polynomial and the sets are semialgebraic,
an upper bound and a polynomial barrier certificate
which certifies the upper bound can be computed by formulating
(26)–(29) or (27)–(29) and (30) as a sum of squares optimization problem, similar to what we describe in Section IV-A. Furthermore, can be chosen as the objective function of the SOS
4Note that the original problem is actually equivalent to a bilinear matrix inequality (BMI) problem [30].

and
. In this case, the
matrix is positive semidefinite, which implies the existence
(and
of a sum of squares decomposition for
hence its nonnegativity). That (2)–(3) are satisfied can be shown
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Fig. 2. Block diagram of the system in Section V-B. We ask if it is possible to
design a controller K that steers the system from an initial set X to a destination
set X , subject to some other specifications.

Fig. 1. Phase portrait of the system in Section V-A. Solid patches are (from
left to right) X and X , respectively. Dashed curves are the zero level set of
B (x), whereas solid curves are some trajectories of the system. The function
B (x) is strictly greater than zero for all x 2 X and strictly less than zero for
all x 2 X .

by sum of squares arguments as well, and is also depicted pictorially in Fig. 1. The zero level set of the barrier certificate sepafrom all trajectories starting from . Hence the safety
rates
of the system is verified.
B. Hybrid System With Integral Constraint
This example illustrates a possible application of safety verification techniques to determine the feasibility of a controller
design. More specifically, we will analyze the reachability property of a linear system in feedback interconnection with a relay.
The block diagram of the system is shown in Fig. 2, with the
, and given by
matrices

and the relay element having the following characteristic:
if
if

Fig. 3. Phase portrait of the system in Section V-C. Trajectories of the systems
x_ = A x and x_ = A x starting at x(0) = (0; 3) are shown by the dashed
and dash-dotted curves, respectively. A realization of the switching diffusion
process for  = 10 is depicted by the solid curve. Shaded region at the bottom
of the figure is the unsafe set.

in the way shown in Fig. 2, such that the system can be steered
to
while maintaining the state in ?
from
-gain of the controller is no
The requirement that the
greater than one can be equivalently formulated as an integral
quadratic constraint (IQC) [29]

For the sets

we pose the following question: is it possible to design a
(possibly nonlinear and time-varying) with the
controller
-gain no greater than one, which is connected to the system

This specification introduces dynamic uncertainty to the
problem. Nevertheless, we can perform reachability analysis
by adjoining the above IQC using a nonnegative constant
multiplier to the conditions on the time derivative of barrier
certificates (cf. Theorem 9). For this example, a quartic barrier
certificate that satisfies the required conditions can be found.
Hence, we conclude that the given specification is impossible
to meet.
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C. Switching Diffusion Process
In this example, we consider the system

where

and

It can be shown using a common polynomial Lyapunov function of degree six that the deterministic system corresponding
is globally asymptotically stable under arbitrary
to
switching (cf. [37, Example 2]).
or
We assume that the initial condition is given by
, with equal probability for both locations, and
.
, trajectories
For the initial continuous condition
of the deterministic system corresponding to the first and second
locations are shown in Fig. 3. We choose
as the set of continuous states,
as the unsafe set. The
and
safety of the stochastic system with transition rates
, is to be verified, where the
nonnegative parameter will be varied. Larger means that
from location 2 the system tends to switch to location 1 faster.
This problem can be given the following interpretation.
Although in both locations the system will evolve toward the
origin, location 2 is different from location 1 in the sense that
it has an oscillatory response which tends to bring the system
to the unsafe region whereas the trajectory corresponding to
location 1 will evolve directly to the origin without going
through the unsafe region. In the verification, we will show that
by using a large , i.e., making the system be in location 1 for
most of the time, the probability of reaching the unsafe set can
be kept small.
Using polynomial barrier certificates of degree 10, we can
prove that the probability of reaching the unsafe region is
for
bounded from above by
for
, and
for
. As expected, the
probability bound decreases when we increase .
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented in the previous sections a framework
based on deductive inference and functions of states termed
barrier certificates for verifying system safety in the worst-case
and stochastic settings. In the worst-case setting, such properties can be verified without explicitly computing the set
of reachable states. This makes the methodology directly
applicable to continuous and hybrid systems with nonlinear,
uncertain, and constrained dynamics. In addition, by using
barrier certificates that generate nonnegative supermartingales
under the given system dynamics, we are able to handle safety
verification of stochastic continuous and hybrid systems by
computing certified upper bounds on the probability of reaching
the unsafe region.

Most of the conditions satisfied by barrier certificates form
convex optimization problems. When the system is described in
terms of polynomials, this provides the possibility to search for
appropriate barrier certificates using a convex relaxation framework called sum of squares optimization. For nonconvex conditions, an iterative method for computing barrier certificates has
also been proposed. A hierarchical search based on bounding
the degrees of the polynomial expressions can be performed,
such that at each level the complexity grows polynomially with
respect to the system size. Some examples have been presented
to illustrate the use of the proposed methodology.
A derivation of a converse theorem for barrier certificates,
and extensions of the barrier certificate approach for verifying
properties other than safety, such as reachability or eventuality,
can be found in [40] and [41].
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